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Abstract
In this paper we present methods for attacking and defending k-gram statistical analysis techniques
that are used, for example, in network traffic analysis and covert channel detection. The main new result
is our demonstration of how to use a behavior’s or process’ k-order statistics to build a stochastic process
that has those same k-order stationary statistics but possesses different, deliberately designed, (k + 1)-
order statistics if desired. Such a model realizes a “complexification” of the process or behavior which
a defender can use to monitor whether an attacker is shaping the behavior. By deliberately introducing
designed (k + 1)-order behaviors, the defender can check to see if those behaviors are present in the
data. We also develop constructs for source codes that respect the k-order statistics of a process while
encoding covert information. One fundamental consequence of these results is that certain types of
behavior analyses techniques come down to an arms race in the sense that the advantage goes to the
party that has more computing resources applied to the problem.
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Index Terms
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I. INTRODUCTION
Computer security researchers have been investigating statistical behavioral modeling tech-
niques as a means for determining whether a machine, a network or data packet contents are
behaving “normally” or not. These are so-called behavior analysis techniques and implicitly
model stochastic processes at some level of fidelity.
Consider for example, the problem of detecting covert channels. Some existing approaches
assume that an adversary has installed an exfiltrating agent, or Trojan, which operates by encoding
data in a way that introduces detectable regularities in some network traffic statistics. For
example, Giani et al. [1] and Cabuk et al. [2] estimate certain first order statistics of packet
inter-arrival delays in order to determine whether a time covert channel is being used. Dainotti
et al. [3] learn a Hidden Markov Process [4], [5], [6], [7], [8] using both packet inter-arrival delays
and packet sizes to detect traffic anomalies. Other techniques are based on various analyses of
n-gram statistics [9]. In fact, some have called techniques that match n-gram statistics “mimicry
attacks” and while techniques have been developed for detecting certain simple types of mimicry,
techniques for building mimicry attacks as described in the present paper appear to be novel [9].
General discussions of covert channels and their taxonomies, existence and modeling have been
published [10], [11], [12], [13], [14]. The design, implementation and experimental evaluation
of several specific covert channel attacks in real systems is of specific interest [14]. That work
presents threat models, achievable bit rates, noise properties and channel capacities for covert
channels.
The existence and successful use of a covert channel is based on the assumption that the
covert channel code does not perturb the measured statistical properties of behavior so that,
over time, a covert transmission does not introduce discernible patterns which are different than
expected, at least with respect to what is measured. In this paper we assume the ability to learn
a k-gram type model of “normal behavior.” This is simply done by counting the occurrences
of k-grams and then normalizing to produce frequencies or probabilities. It is important to note
that researchers often talk about entropy as a channel statistic [10], [15] but entropy is typically
October 29, 2018 DRAFT
CRESPI, CYBENKO, GIANI 3
calculated from k-order statistics so that our methods for preserving k-order statistics preserves
all lower order statistics and will also preserve the entropy.
We present a technique for encoding messages that respects these k-order statistics. Both
attacker and defender can use this coding technique. The attacker could exfiltrate coded in-
formation while the defender could embed an encoded reference message or carrier to detect
manipulations of the channel by an adversary attempting covert communications. That is, for
any order k, an attacker or a defender can encode covert messages while otherwise respecting
the k-order statistics of the traffic.
Also, we show how a defender can create a process of order k + 1 which has the same
k-order statistics but specifically designed (k + 1)-order statistics that the defender can easily
monitor to see if the (k+1)-order statistics have been changed. Researchers have recently started
to develop systematic taxonomies and examples of attacks against statistical machine learning
techniques [16]. In that spirit, the present work develops specific techniques to both attack and
defend using certain statistical approaches.
We discuss these methods in the context of behaviors that have a finite set of observable
symbols (the alphabet). Interpacket arrival times, packet sizes, header fields, packet contents and
so on are examples of such observables if quantized into a finite number of bins. Our approach
models the observables as a stationary stochastic process X [17]. After estimating the k-order
statistics, we build a Probabilistic Deterministic Finite Automata model (PDFA) [18], [19], [20],
[21] that realizes the k-order statistics.
Using that PDFA, we show that:
1) an adversary can encode messages covertly while respecting the k-order statistics;
2) the defender can encode reference messages or a carrier while respecting the k-order
statistics and;
3) the defender can build a more complex process which has the same k-order statistics but
possesses deliberately designed (k + 1)-order statistics.
Examples of such covert channels in network traffic include, but are not restricted to:
• Timing Channels: The observable symbols are the inter-packet time delays, appropriately
quantized;
• Size Channels: The observable symbols are quantized sizes of the packets;
• Header Channels: The observable symbols are various header fields in TCP/IP packets
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which can be manipulated by the transmitting entity without violating protocol semantics.
Several such fields are known to exist [22].
It is important to clarify right away what we mean by a k-order statistic and a k-gram.
Suppose we have an alphabet consisting of {α, β, γ} and we observe a sequence comprised of
that alphabet, say
αααβαβγγ.
The first order statistics are [1/2 1/4 1/4] indicating that 1/2 of the symbols are α’s, 1/4 are β’s
and 1/4 are γ’s. The 1-grams are merely {α, β, γ}.
The 2-grams observed in this sequence are αα, αα, αβ, βα, αβ, βγ, γγ and the 2-order
statistics for the 9 possible 2-grams
αα, αβ, αγ, βα, ββ, βγ, γα, γβ, γγ
are respectively
[2/7 2/7 0 1/7 0 1/7 0 0 1/7].
That is, our k-grams are obtained by moving a sliding window of width k across the data one
symbol at a time. This is not to be confused with moving that window across the data sequence
k symbols at a time.
The following discussion shows how a timing covert channel can be constructed based on a
beacon and argues that a naive encoding of covert messages based on packet inter-arrival times
produces a clearly detectable distortion of the 1-order statistics of those time intervals in network
traffic [23], [1].
Figure 1 describes the setup. Machine A sends a regularly timed beacon to machine D. (Such a
beacon can be a time server request or a stay alive beacon for instance.) The inter-packet delays
seen at machine B are not regular due to internal routing delays in the LAN. (These statistics
were actually measured from a regularly timed beacon traveling several hops.) An intruder was
able to compromise and control machine B which is inside the local network and a relay for the
traffic between A and D. (B could be a proxy server, border router or other device for example.)
Assume we set up a machine C outside the internal network perimeter to check for timing covert
channels. C has seen a certain distribution of inter-packet delays coming from A going to D.
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Fig. 1. An intruder controlling machine B inside a local network exfiltrates data coded in inter-packet delays received by
machine C en route to machine D. Monitoring outside the intranet LAN will show the same first order inter-packet delays with
or without the covert channel as constructed in this paper.
In this paper, we show how machine B can encode covert messages in the inter-packet delays
in such a way that the first order statistics as seen by C remain unchanged from the original
distribution. Conversely, we can deliberately defend against such channels by encoding messages
so that any manipulation of the delays will be detectable on the outside at machine C, because
the covert message will not be received at C.
Figure 2 shows the number of packets received with a given delay in two scenarios. The
horizontal axis reports the inter-arrival time in seconds, and the vertical axis the number of
packets received with those delays. In the left graph of Figure 2 are the observed inter-packet
delays resulting from a regularly timed beacon traversing multiple hops in a LAN. On the
right hand graph, we depict a naive covert timing channel using two time intervals to encode a
message. It is evident from the data that the naive covert communication in the right graph can
be easily detected if the 1-order statistics of normal traffic have been measured and are those on
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Fig. 2. First order statistics of inter-packet delays of normal traffic (left) and a poorly designed covert channel using two
delays only (right). (Packets were deliberately routed to hop several times between source and destination.) This paper develops
techniques for creating covert channels that have the same statistics as the ones depicted on the left, even if higher order statistics
are measured.
the left. However, the 1-order distribution on the left can be generated either by normal traffic,
as it was obtained, or by a covert channel, as we will show.
In this contribution, we develop a more sophisticated approach than the naive approach insofar
as we consider also statistics of arbitrarily higher order, i.e. k > 1, and our results effectively
show that, for any k, defenders and attackers both have technical approaches for, respectively,
attacking or defending a k-order behavior with respect to covert communications. Consequently,
the situation is an arms race in the sense that whichever side has the ability to learn the highest
order statistics wins.
A. Outline of the Paper
In Section II we present an illustrative example. In Section III we describe our method and
show how to manipulate a behavior’s statistics with Probabilistic Automata. In Section IV we
provide a numerical example. In Section V we show how to use Probabilistic Automata to
build a channel code that respects the statistics of traffic up to some predecided order. Finally,
Section VI contains some conclusions and future work references.
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II. A SIMPLE ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
To illustrate these concepts, consider a simple binary observable with values, 0 and 1. It is
assumed that these observables are irrelevant to the normal operation of the underlying system
and its semantics. For example, the observables could be quantized inter-arrival times or unused
packet header fields.
Assume that the 1-order statistics of these observables are r0 > 0 and r1 > 0 with r0 +r1 = 1.
This means that the relative frequency of 0’s and 1’s as observed in the behavior are r0 and r1
respectively. Now suppose an attacker has estimated these probabilities and seeks to exfiltrate
messages while respecting these probabilities. This is possible and, later in this paper, we review
standard source coding ideas that allow the attacker to create such codes efficiently.
In fact, if the messages to be sent are binary and Bernoulli with p = 0.5 (such as for encrypted
and/or compressed messages), then there are codes that use 1/H(r0) = 1/H(r1) bits in the covert
channel per original message symbol where H(x) = −(x log2 x + (1 − x) log2(1 − x)) is the
entropy function. We show how to construct such codes to respect k-order statistics as well.
By the same token, the defender can encode a reference signal, also respecting the first order
statistics as above, which can be decoded and verified at the receiving end.
Note that no specific second order statistics r00, r01, r10 and r11 have been modeled so far, but
if the process is modeled by a Bernoulli process with p = r1 then the second order statistics
would be ri · rj = rij = Prob(ij) = Prob(ji) by independence.
However, the defender can construct a second order process with second order statistics
r00, r01, r10 and r11 for which rij 6= ri · rj while satisfying the required first order statistics,
namely r0 and r1. If the attacker exploits the channel through a purely first order process, the
constructed second order statistics rij will likely not be observed by the defender who could
then conclude that the traffic is being shaped by an adversary.
To illustrate this 2-order construction, consider an automaton with two states, Q = {0, 1},
corresponding to the two 1-grams of observables. Let X be the matrix of the transition proba-
bilities
X =
 p00 p01
p10 p11
 .
We seek PDFAs that have the stationary distribution pi = [r0 1− r0] = [1− r1 r1] = [1− r r].
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Specifically, we seek X that satisfies
[1− r r] ·X = piX = pi = [1− r r]
with X being a stochastic matrix (non-negative with row sums equal to 1). The class of PDFAs
that are 1-order equivalent to the given process is therefore determined by a set of linear equality
and inequality constraints as follows:
(1− r) · p00 + r · p01 = 1− r
(1− r) · p10 + r · p11 = r
p00 + p01 = 1
p10 + p11 = 1
pij ≥ 0.
The four equations are linearly dependent and we can reduce them to the three equations and
constraints
r · p11 − (1− r) · p00 = 2 · r − 1
p00 + p01 = 1
p10 + p11 = 1
0 ≤ p00 , p11 ≤ 1.
There are an infinite number of solutions according to
p11 =
1− r
r
p00 +
2r − 1
r
, 0 ≤ p00 , p11 ≤ 1. (1)
For example, if r = 0.3, 1− r = 0.7 then the constraints become:
p11 =
0.7p00 − 0.4
0.3
0 ≤ p00 , p11 ≤ 1
so letting p00 = 0.8 we get p11 = 0.160.3 = 0.53¯ and therefore p01 = 0.2 and p10 = 0.46¯. This
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yields 2-order statistics of:
r00 = p00pi1 = 0.8 · 0.7 = 0.56
r01 = p01pi1 = 0.2 · 0.7 = 0.14
r10 = p10pi2 = 0.46¯ · 0.3 = 0.14
r11 = p11pi2 = 0.53¯ · 0.3 = 0.16.
Notice that r01 = r10 = 0.14, r01 + r00 = r0 = pi1 = 0.3 and r01 + r11 = r1 = pi2 = 0.7 as
required.
Another, equivalent way to derive these relations is to note that there are two trivial solutions
for X , namely X1 = I2 (the 2 by 2 identity matrix) and X2 = 1 · pi where 1 = [1 1]T is the
column vector whose entries are all 1’s. These two solutions are always different. Moreover, we
can see that any convex combination ρX1 + (1 − ρ)X2 for 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 is also a solution to all
the constraints and in fact yields the same class of solutions as above.
The point of this example is that we can shape the second order statistics of the observables
without changing the first order statistics. In particular, multiple choices for p00 (and so for r00)
are possible, all of which lead to the same 1-order statistics. A defender can shape the second
order statistics so that if an attacker only obeys the first order statistics, the defender can detect
that the expected second order statistics are wrong.
Note that the second order process in this example satisfies an additional constraint - namely,
the marginal distributions must agree with the first order process, namely r01 + r11 = r1 and so
on. Moreover, r01 = r10 must be true as well (this is a symmetry which arises from considering
the 0 to 1 and 1 to 0 transitions in the observed sequence which must be equal). For higher
order processes, the construction involves identifying and dealing with additional constraints and
finding realizations which satisfy them. These generalizations to higher orders are one of the
main contributions of this paper.
To apply this construction to the empirical data shown in Figure 2, normalize the counts
into frequencies or probabilities by dividing by the total packet count. This yields a vector of
probabilities:
R = [ 0.0029 0.0144 0.0734 0.1453 0.3094 0.1295 0.1151 0.1079 0.1007 0 0 0 0.0014 ] (2)
October 29, 2018 DRAFT
CRESPI, CYBENKO, GIANI 10
where the coordinates 1 through 13 correspond to delays of 0.01 through 0.13 in increments of
0.01.
We seek to construct a Markov Chain whose states correspond to observable inter-packet
delays and whose transition probabilities, P , describe the probability that one delay follows
another. As explained above, P must satisfy two matrix equations (capturing the facts that R is
a stationary vector for P and that P is row stochastic)
R ∗ P = R and P ∗ 1 = 1
where 1 is the column vector of all ones. Moreover, the entries of P are all non-negative.
In this simple case, there are two solutions which are simple to identify, namely
PB = 1 ∗R and PD = I (3)
where I is the 13 by 13 identity matrix. The reader can easily check that both these matrices
satisfy the two required matrix equations. This construct is simple for 1-grams but becomes
more complex for general k-grams as shown below.
Moreover, for any 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, Pα = αPB + (1−α)PD is also a solution. Whereas PB defines
a Bernoulli process and PD describes a completely disconnected Markov Chain with an infinite
number of fixed distributions, Pα defines a Markov Chain that is irreducible, aperiodic and not
a Bernoulli process for any 0 < α < 1 . Therefore, Pα can be used by a defender to create
specific second order statistics which an attacker would have to first model and then respect.
III. CONSTRUCTING THE AUTOMATA
In this section, we show how to construct automata that can reproduce observed statistics
computed from data.
Let Σ = {a, b, c, ...} be the finite observable alphabet and σ = |Σ| < ∞ be the number of
observables. We are assuming that we have sequences of observables from which we compute
the relative frequencies of k-grams (k ≥ 1):
0 ≤ R(x) ≤ 1, ∑
x∈Σk
R(x) = 1.
Here Σk is the set of k-grams; that is, the set of all possible sequences of length k drawn from
the alphabet Σ.
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Roughly speaking, if s0s1...sn−1 = S0:n−1 is an observed data sequence of length n > k, R(x)
is approximated by the number of occurrences of the substring x in S0:n−1 divided by the total
number of substrings of length k in S0:n−1, namely n − k + 1. The set of R(x)’s is precisely
what we mean by the k-order statistics of the observations.
These statistics must satisfy certain regularity conditions required by the proposed construction
so some care must be taken in their computation. Specifically, the identity∑
a∈Σ
R(ay) =
∑
b∈Σ
R(yb) = R(y)
should hold for every y ∈ Σk−1. This can be accomplished by appending S0:n−1 with s0s1...sk−2
as a suffix, creating a periodic string effectively, and counting occurrences in the periodic string.
Moreover, this can be repeated for every 1 < j < k by using a circular buffer appending
s0s1...sj−2. All marginal distributions∑
w∈Σk−j
R(wy) =
∑
w∈Σk−j
R(yw) = R(y)
will hold for all y ∈ Σj then. (Details are left to the reader.)
We will now construct a special type of Markov Chain in which Σk are the states and the
semantics of the k-grams are preserved so that if x = ay ∈ Σk is an observed k-gram, then
P (ay, yb) is the probability of transitioning to state yb where both a, b ∈ Σ. Such transitions
are the only ones possible in the Markov Chain k-gram model. Such models are called kth-order
Markov Models, k Markov Chains or k-gram models by different authors [19], [24].
Let pi be the vector of measured k-gram statistics, R(x), and let P be the desired Markov
Chain transition probabilities:
P = (P (x, x′))
where the entries of both pi and P are indexed by x, x′ ∈ Σk.
The stationary probabilities of the desired Markov Chain are precisely pi when the equa-
tion piP = pi is satisfied. This matrix equation consists of σk equations and the stochasticity
requirement on P is another σk equations resulting in the following 2σk equations overall:
∑
x∈Σk
P (x, x′)R(x) = R(x′), ∀x′ ∈ Σk , (stationary probability conditions) (4)
∑
x′∈Σk
P (x, x′) = 1, ∀x ∈ Σk (probability requirements) (5)
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where P (x, x′) ≥ 0 as well.
Because of the relationship between k-grams and the Markov Chain that we are seeking to
construct, we can only have P (x, x′) 6= 0 when x = ay and x′ = yb for some a, b ∈ Σ and
y ∈ Σk−1. That is, y is the suffix of the state x = ay and we can only transition to states x′ = yb
which have y as a prefix and some suffix b ∈ Σ. Accordingly, for every y ∈ Σk−1, we have the
2σ equations ∑
a∈Σ
P (ay, yb)R(ay) = R(yb), ∀b ∈ Σ , (6)
∑
b∈Σ
P (ay, yb) = 1, ∀a ∈ Σ (7)
P (ay, yb) ≥ 0 (8)
which are completely decoupled from the equations corresponding to (k − 1)-grams other than
y. Accordingly, we can solve each system independently.
Noting that the k-grams statistics, R(x), satisfy the marginalization relations∑
a∈Σ
R(ay) =
∑
b∈Σ
R(yb) = R(y), ∀y ∈ Σk−1,
summing over b in the equations (6), we get∑
b∈Σ
∑
a∈Σ
P (ay, yb)R(ay) =
∑
a∈Σ
∑
b∈Σ
P (ay, yb)R(ay) =
∑
a∈Σ
R(ay) =
∑
b∈Σ
R(yb) = R(y)
which is an identity not involving the unknown P (ay, yb).
Accordingly, there are no more than 2σ − 1 linearly independent equations in (6). In fact, if
we define pre(y) to be the number of nonzero R(ay) and post(y) be the number of nonzero
R(yb), there are in fact no more than pre(y) · post(y) unknown probabilities, P (ay, yb), and no
more than pre(y) + post(y)− 1 independent equations altogether.
A. The Standard Solution
One solution to the equations, which we call the Standard Solution, is P¯ (ay, yb) = R(yb)/R(y)
because then∑
a∈Σ
P¯ (ay, yb)R(ay) =
∑
a∈Σ
R(ay)R(yb)/R(y) = R(yb)/R(y)
∑
a∈Σ
R(ay) = R(yb)
and ∑
b∈Σ
P¯ (ay, yb) =
∑
b∈Σ
R(yb)/R(y) = R(y)/R(y) = 1.
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This specific solution has pre(y) · post(y) nonzero probabilities, P (ay, yb), for the substring
y ∈ Σk−1 by construction.
By construction, this Markov Chain is irreducible because we have constructed the transition
probabilities from a circular buffer so that there is a nonzero probability of going from any
state with nonzero probability, namely R(x), to any other state with nonzero probability. If
additionally the constructed Standard Solution Markov Chain is aperiodic, its unique stationary
distribution is precisely R(x) and its entropy rate is
H(P¯ ) = HP (Xk+1|Xk1 ) = −
∑
a∈Σ
∑
y∈Σk−1
∑
b∈Σ
R(ay)P¯ (ay, yb) log(P¯ (ay, yb)). (9)
B. Extended Solutions
If pre(y) and post(y) are both strictly greater than 1, then pre(y) · post(y) > pre(y) +
post(y) − 1. From the theory of linear programming, there are feasible solutions to the linear
program defined by (6), (7) and (8) which have no more than pre(y) + post(y) − 1 nonzero
coordinates, namely the Basic Feasible Solutions [25].
Let such a Basic Feasible Solution be Pˆ (ay, yb). As derived above, there are solutions with
exactly pre(y) · post(y) nonzero coordinates, namely the Standard Solutions, P¯ (ay, yb). Note
that strict convex combinations of Pˆ with P¯ , Pu = uPˆ + (1 − u)P¯ with 0 < u < 1, define a
continuum of solutions to (6), (7) and (8), with each solution corresponding to an irreducible
Markov Chain. This is the case because every state is reachable from every other state with
nonzero probability due to the construction of the Standard Solution.
Moreover, when pre(y) and post(y) are both strictly greater than 1, Pˆ and P¯ are different.
As an aside, we have observed that Basic Feasible Solutions typically result in reducible chains
because those solutions involve a minimal number of nonzero transition probabilities.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section we demonstrate the constructions described above.
1) We consider data generated by the automata depicted in Figure 3 which is a Hidden Markov
Model (HMM), M = {A(0), A(1)}, defined by the two transition matrices
A(0) =
 0.5 0.5
0 0.5
 , A(1) =
 0 0
0.5 0
 .
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Fig. 3. A two state Hidden Markov Model used to generate data for the example. Transitions between states are labeled with
the emitted symbols and the probabilities that the transitions occur so that 0 | 0.5 means the transition occurs with probability
0.5 and emits the symbol “0.”
The stochastic process of observables is not Markovian of any order as can be seen by
the fact that
P (yt = 0|yt−k...yt−1 = 0k) 6= P (yt = 0|yt−k−1yt−k...yt−1 = 10k)
for any k. Moreover, it can be shown that this process is not equivalent to any Probabilistic
Deterministic Finite State Automaton.
We generated a sequence of 1000 observations by performing a simulation of this HMM,
starting in state 1.
2) We set k = 2 and computed the statistics R(xy) and R(xyz) by scanning the data sequence
from left to right and computing sample averages as appropriate:
R(00) = 0.513
R(01) = 0.244
R(10) = 0.244
R(11) = 0.000

,
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and 
R(000) = 0.338
R(001) = 0.174
R(010) = 0.244
R(011) = 0.000
R(100) = 0.174
R(101) = 0.070
R(110) = 0.000
R(111) = 0.000

.
Observe that R(01) = R(10) which is a necessary regularity that follows from the marginal-
ization property: ∑
a
R(ay) =
∑
b
R(yb) = R(y) .
In order to be sure that the estimates verify those consistency conditions we have treated
the data stream as a circular buffer as described previously.
3) We built the Standard Solution, P , where P (ay, yb) = R(yb)/R(y), and then we computed
a different numerical solution, Pˆ , of the linear program (6), (7) and (8).1 The two solutions
are summarized below:
P (00, 00) = 0.678
P (00, 01) = 0.322
P (10, 00) = 0.678
P (10, 01) = 0.322
P (01, 10) = 1.000
P (01, 11) = 0.000
P (11, 10) = 1.000
P (11, 11) = 0.000

,

Pˆ (00, 00) = 1.000
Pˆ (00, 01) = 0.000
Pˆ (10, 00) = 0.000
Pˆ (10, 01) = 1.000
Pˆ (01, 10) = 1.000
Pˆ (01, 11) = 0.000
Pˆ (11, 10) = 0.000
Pˆ (11, 11) = 1.000

.
Note that the Basic Feasible Solution, Pˆ , has a maximal number of zeros and results in a
reducible chain with three communicating classes, namely 00, {01, 10}, 11. By convexity
1Pˆ is a Basic Feasible Solution obtained by employing the Matlab linprog function.
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Pu = u · P + (1 − u) · Pˆ is also a solution, for any 0 < u < 1, so that for u = 0.5 and
u = 0.2 we obtain respectively the following two different 2-grams:
P0.5(00, 00) = 0.839
P0.5(00, 01) = 0.161
P0.5(10, 00) = 0.339
P0.5(10, 01) = 0.661
P0.5(01, 10) = 1.000
P0.5(01, 11) = 0.000
P0.5(11, 10) = 0.500
P0.5(11, 11) = 0.500

,

P0.2(00, 00) = 0.936
P0.2(00, 01) = 0.064
P0.2(10, 00) = 0.136
P0.2(10, 01) = 0.864
P0.2(01, 10) = 1.000
P0.2(01, 11) = 0.000
P0.2(11, 10) = 0.200
P0.2(11, 11) = 0.800

.
4) Now compare the original 2-order statistics specified by M with the statistics specified by
the two new models, namely P0.5 and P0.2 as above:
R(00) = 0.513
R(01) = 0.244
R(10) = 0.244
R(11) = 0.000

,

R0.5(00) = 0.513
R0.5(01) = 0.244
R0.5(10) = 0.244
R0.5(11) = 0.000

,

R0.2(00) = 0.513
R0.2(01) = 0.244
R0.2(10) = 0.244
R0.2(11) = 0.000

.
They are numerically identical as expected. Finally we verify that the 3-order statistics
are all different from each other and from the 3-order statistics of the original data, R,
previously listed.
R(000) = 0.348
R(001) = 0.165
R(010) = 0.244
R(011) = 0.000
R(100) = 0.165
R(101) = 0.079
R(110) = 0.000
R(111) = 0.000

,

Rˆ(000) = 0.513
Rˆ(001) = 0.000
Rˆ(010) = 0.244
Rˆ(011) = 0.000
Rˆ(100) = 0.000
Rˆ(101) = 0.244
Rˆ(110) = 0.000
Rˆ(111) = 0.000

,

R0.5(000) = 0.430
R0.5(001) = 0.083
R0.5(010) = 0.244
R0.5(011) = 0.000
R0.5(100) = 0.083
R0.5(101) = 0.161
R0.5(110) = 0.000
R0.5(111) = 0.000

,

R0.2(000) = 0.480
R0.2(001) = 0.033
R0.2(010) = 0.244
R0.2(011) = 0.000
R0.2(100) = 0.033
R0.2(101) = 0.211
R0.2(110) = 0.000
R0.2(111) = 0.000

.
These 3-order statistics are calculated using the relationships
R˜(ayb) = R(ay) · P˜ (ay, yb)
for the various R˜, a, y, b. Moreover, the Ru are the same convex combinations as the
the various Pu’s. This example illustrates the various constructions we have described in
complete generality in the previous section.
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V. A COVERT CHANNEL CODING TECHNIQUE
In the previous section, we showed that given observed string frequencies, R(z), z ∈ Σk we
can construct multiple Markov Chains, M , whose states are the k-grams (z ∈ Σk), transition
probabilities are P (ay, yb), a ∈ Σ, y ∈ Σk−1 and whose stationary distributions are precisely
the observed R.
We now show how to use such a Markov Chain to encode messages while preserving the
statistics, R, of the channel. This means that someone monitoring the channel will observe the
same k-gram statistics in spite of the fact that covert messages can be communicated within that
channel. As noted before, this can be exploited by either attacker or defender.
Conceptually, the coding concept is the opposite of the classical Shannon Source Coding
Theorem [17] in the sense that traditionally we start with a stochastic source with entropy rate
H that we seek to compress into binary strings whereas in this case we start with a collection of
2r messages which we wish to efficiently encode using the dynamics and statistics of the given
stochastic process. Because we have to respect the statistics of the channel, the encoding will
typically not be be compressing but expanding the number of bits needed. Nonetheless, we still
seek efficiency with respect to observing the channel’s k-gram statistics.
In this work, we will assume, for simplicity, that the communication covert channel is noiseless
noting that the results can be extended to noisy channels in the traditional way. A more thorough
analysis is deferred to a future study in which the Shannon capacity of noisy channels will be
considered.
This construction involves several steps:
1) Compute the entropy of the irreducible Markov Chain M , HM , specified by transition
probabilities, PM , and stationary distribution, RM :
HM = −
∑
ay∈Σk
RM(ay)
∑
b∈Σ
PM(ay, yb) log2(PM(ay, yb)).
Note that we construct the Markov Chains to have a given stationary distribution, R, so
only PM is different for the different models.
For the examples developed in the previous section, we have computed:
HP = 0.6863 , HPˆ = 0 , HP0.2 = 0.3165 , HP0.5 = 0.5520.
Note that Pˆ is entirely deterministic and so has zero entropy.
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Since we constructed these Markov Chains so that different transitions from a state cor-
respond to different observables (that is, be DPFA’s), knowledge of the initial state of
the Markov Chain results in a one-to-one correspondence between state sequences and
observation sequences. Hence the entropy rates of both the Markov Chain state sequences
and resulting observation sequences are the same.
Let Ys represent the stochastic process of observations produced by the constructed Markov
Chain, M , starting in state s ∈ M . All states in M are recurrent by construction so the
entropy rate of each process Ys is the same and equal to HM .
2) Apply the Shannon-MacMillan-Breiman Asymptotic Equipartition Property (AEP) The-
orem [17] to each Ys showing that for large n there are approximately 2nHM typical
sequences of length n of Ys and each occurs with probability approximately (1/2)nHM .
Consequently, in order to encode 2r covert messages, say Ci with 1 ≤ i ≤ 2r we must
have r ≤ nHM or equivalently n ≥ r/HM so n is selected to encode 2r different covert
message sequences accordingly.
3) Construct length n typical sequences of Ys by starting in state s and then performing a
random walk of length n in M according to the probabilities PM . Such random walks
define observation sequences of length n in Σn. Produce 2r ≤ 2nHM unique sequences for
each state s, labeling them as Ys(i) where 1 ≤ i ≤ 2r ≤ 2nHM . (If a random walk produces
a sequence already generated, simply repeat until a novel random walk is produced.)
4) Note that the k-gram frequencies of each z ∈ Σk within the Ys(i) approach the original
R(z) as n → ∞ because R is the stationary distribution of the Markov Chain and Ys(i)
is produced by taking a random walk in the chain.
5) For each state, s, assign the covert message Ci to Ys(i). Pick a random initial state s(0)
and assign a sequences of covert messages Ci1Ci2 ...Cim to
Ys(0)(i1)Ys(1)(i2)...Ys(m−1)(im)
where s(j) is recursively defined as the state in which Ys(j−1)(ij) ended.
Because each random walk in the sequence thus constructed starts in the state in which the
previous random walk ended, the concatenated sequence of random walks is also a legal random
walk in the Markov Chain, obeying all the transition probabilities. Moreover, the k-gram statistics
in the overall concatenated sequence of mn observations is approximately R and approaches R
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Fig. 4. The frequencies of the 13 different delays measured from the codeword sequence are in the right graph. This is to
be compared with the left graph which is from the empirical data as in Figure 2. Someone monitoring the delays would see no
change in the distribution but a covert channel is present.
as n→∞. The encoded sequence is uniquely decodable by the receiver as well.
To illustrate this construction, consider the example presented in the left of Figure 2 where
we use the 1-order statistics as in equation (2). We take the convex combination (see Section II)
P = 0.75 · PB + 0.25 · PD,
which results in an entropy of HP = 0.004 as computed from (9). We build a (2r, n) codebook
as described above with r = 8 and n = dr/HP e = 1995. That is, this encodes binary sequences
of length 8 into inter-packet delays of length 1995. We encoded 16 blocks of 8 random source
bits each into 16 ·1995 = 31920 symbols from the alphabet Σ = {1, 2, . . . , 13} which correspond
to the delays in the left graph of Figure 2.
The obtained 1-order statistics of the resulting 31920 long concatenated codeword are
R′ = [0.0029 0.0144 0.0734 0.1453 0.3094 0.1295 0.1151 0.1079 0.1007 0 0 0 0.0014];
and are depicted in Figure 4. Note the empirical frequencies and graphs are identical to the
displayed precision.
This illustrates empirically the effectiveness of the construction described in this paper. Matlab
code for reproducing these results is available upon request.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has demonstrated that covert channels can exist even when arbitrarily high order
statistics about a channel are estimated and monitored. The resulting covert channels can be used
to either exploit or defend the channel and the advantage goes to the party that has the ability
to estimate the highest order statistics.
The adversarial nature of this situation falls within the scope of cognitive attacks [26], [27].
It can be described in abstract as follows: the environment (for example, inter-packet delays) is
modeled as a stochastic process X (such as a Hidden Markov Model, Markov Chain or other
formalism). Both the attacker, A, and the defender, D, monitor the environment through functions
fA ∈ F and fD ∈ F respectively (for example, fD(X ) could be the probability distribution of
k-grams produced by X ).
The attacker guesses fD and manipulates X in order to produce a new process, A(X ), so
that covert communications can be performed while respecting the behavior that the defender
expects; namely, fD(X ) = fD(A(X )).
On the other hand, the defender, by anticipating the attacker’s guess of fD, picks a different
f˜D and manipulates X to produce a new process D(X ) so that:
1) fD(A(D(X ))) = fD(D(X )) = fD(X ) = fD(A(X )): the defensive shaping action is
imperceptible to the defender who uses fD;
2) f˜D(A(D(X ))) 6= f˜D(D(X )): the attacker’s action (that is, creation of a covert channel) is
detectable by the defender.
The game consists of attacker and defender guessing and then exploiting each other’s monitoring
strategy and manipulating the environment accordingly. The common objective of the players is
to alter the environment in a manner that would be imperceptible to the opponent in order to
perform a secret task (covert communication or covert channel detection).
This work raises some questions which are deferred to future work. In particular, the following
directions are worthy of future investigation:
• Inter-packet delays involve real-world time so the question of stability when shaping the
channel must be considered. That is, packets can be delayed by certain times only if there
are packets in the queue to be delayed. Discussions of such queuing aspects of timing
channels and the possibility of jamming them have been studied [28]. Relating this work
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to timing channel jamming will be investigated.
• We used a circular buffer in Section IV to numerically estimate k-gram statistics so that the
statistics have the required marginalization properties. A single pass, online algorithm for
implementing this circular buffer only requires storing the first and last k symbols of the
data. In the absence of such a buffer, the empirical statistics will not in general obey the
marginalization identities and so some additional processing would be required. The use of
singular value decompositions, non-negative matrix factorizations or other decomposition
methods for imposing the regularity might be worth exploring further as alternatives to the
circular buffer approach.
• In principle, one can attempt to build automata smaller than the Markov Chains we construct.
In particular, Probabilistic Finite Automata (PFA) [29], [30], [31] could implement Markov
Chains based on k-grams but using fewer states. Unlike k-gram based Markov Chains, k-
PSAs have states that are labeled with input sequences of length at most k. So they can
be seen as “variable length” k-gram Markov Chains. They can be learned efficiently in the
KL-PAC sense [32], [33], [34] and are generally smaller than k-gram based Markov chains
(by having fewer states).
• Within the space of possible Markov Chains that realize given k-gram statistics, it would
be good to select the “best” chain from the point of maximizing entropy so that the
covert channel coding is as efficient as possible. Our experiments suggest that the so-called
Standard Solutions presented in Section III-A have the largest entropy although we have
not been able to prove that analytically.
• It is reasonable to ask how our results relate to the use of Hidden Markov Models for
modeling traffic, as for example in [3]. It is known that a Hidden Markov Model with n
states is completely determined by the 2n-grams produced by the model so that reproducing
2n-gram statistics will result in the same n state Hidden Markov Model [8].
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